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Abstract:
Disabled individuals under 65 years old account for 15% of Medicaid
recipients but half of all Medicaid spending. Despite their large cost, few
studies have investigated the effects of Medicaid expansions for disabled
individuals on insurance coverage and crowd-out of private insurance. Using
an eligibility expansion that allowed states to provide Medicaid to disabled
individuals with incomes less than 100% of the federal poverty level, I
address these issues. Crowd-out estimates range from 49% using an ordinary
least squares procedure to 100% using two-stage least- squares analysis.
This potentially large degree of crowd-out could have fiscal implications for
the Affordable Care Act which has greatly expanded Medicaid eligibility in
2014.
Keywords: Medicaid Expansions, Health Insurance, Crowd-out, Disability.
(JEL: H4, I1)

1. Introduction
A major feature of the healthcare reform enacted in the United
States under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) is
the expansion of state Medicaid programs to provide health coverage
to all individuals under the age of 65 who have incomes less than
138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). As of November 2014, only
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27 states have expanded their Medicaid programs, but estimates
suggest that more than 25 million uninsured Americans would gain
coverage if all states were to adopt the legislation (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2012, 2014, Holahan et al., 2012).1 A widespread concern
of expanding Medicaid is that newly eligible individuals who have
private insurance will choose to drop their private plans and take-up
Medicaid coverage instead due to Medicaid’s low cost – a phenomenon
known as “crowd-out.” The Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy
Simulation Model (HIPSM) assumes a crowd-out rate of 22% to predict
changes in insurance coverage from the PPACA (Buettgens, 2011).
This rate is primarily based on crowd-out estimates from Medicaid
expansions for children and their parents. Children and parents are
expected to make up a small portion of the new Medicaid eligibles,
however, under the PPACA. If crowd-out for other populations is larger
than 22%, then the predictions from HIPSM will overestimate the
reduction in the uninsured population from the PPACA Medicaid
expansions (Holahan et al., 2012).
One subset of the population that stands to gain from the PPACA
Medicaid expansions is disabled individuals under 65. Medicaid has
typically only covered disabled individuals with very low income levels,
but the PPACA will allow those with higher levels of income to qualify.
The average income eligibility limit for the disabled was 87% of the
federal poverty level (FPL) in 2008. More than 3.5 million work
disabled Americans had incomes between 87 and 138% FPL in 2011
(Author’s calculations using the March CPS 2012) and would be eligible
for coverage if all states adopt the PPACA Medicaid expansions.
The disabled under 65 are the most expensive coverage group
under Medicaid and accounted for 43% ($160 billion) of total Medicaid
payments even though they made up only 15% of recipients in 2009
(Kaiser Family Foundation: statehealthfacts.org). Despite their
expense, effects from Medicaid eligibility expansions for the disabled
population are not well understood. This paper examines a Medicaid
eligibility expansion that allowed states the option to offer Medicaid to
their disabled residents who had monthly incomes up to 100% of the
FPL. Given their different health needs and cost of care, the disabled

1

Initially, the PPACA Medicaid expansions were required of all states, but became optional under
a June 2012 Supreme Court ruling.
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population may experience a different rate of crowd-out than children
and parents.
In this paper, I focus on the effects of Medicaid eligibility on health
coverage for working-age individuals who report having a work
disability. As with earlier Medicaid expansion research, OLS estimates
are subject to omitted variables bias and measurement error. To
account for these issues, I use the simulated instrument originally
described in Currie and Gruber (1996a and 1996b) to measure only
the legislative effect of changes in Medicaid eligibility. Using two large,
nationally representative datasets and a two-stage least-squares
(2SLS) analysis, I find the rate of crowd-out to be about 100%. This
rate is much larger than what has been found in Medicaid expansions
for parents and children. The point estimate of crowd-out is
statistically significant at the 5% level and is robust to several
alternative samples. The confidence interval for this estimate,
however, is broad and so we interpret it with caution.

2. Literature Review
Simon and Gruber (2008) provide an excellent review of the
crowd-out literature which I will briefly summarize below. The effect of
Medicaid eligibility expansions on participation and crowd-out has been
primarily investigated through expansions for children and their
families. The flagship paper in this field is Cutler and Gruber (1996)
who used a 2SLS approach to investigate the effect of Medicaid
eligibility expansions for children and pregnant women on health
insurance coverage with the simulated eligibility instrument of Currie
and Gruber (1996a, 1996b). Cutler and Gruber (1996) found a large
and statistically significant degree of crowd-out, but many follow-up
papers found smaller amounts. Across the entire literature, crowd-out
measures have varied widely from as small as 0% to as large as 60%
for children and families.2

2

See Aizer and Grogger (2003), Blumberg et al. (2000), Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004), Cutler
and Gruber (1996), Dubay and Kenney (1996) and (1997), Gruber and Simon (2008), Ham and
Shore-Sheppard (2005), Hamersma and Kim (2013), Hudson et al. (2005), LoSasso and
Buchmueller (2004), Shore-Sheppard (2008), Thorpe and Florence (1998), and Yazici and
Kaestner (2000) for these estimates.
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Subsequent papers explain the smaller size of crowd-out through
several key criticisms of the Cutler and Gruber (1996) empirical
strategy, one of which is that they used the annual from the March
Current Population Survey (CPS) rather than monthly data from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). In this paper, I
analyze data from both the CPS and the SIPP and find similar results
for the disabled population. Another critique in this literature is that
crowd-out estimates can be sensitive to the treatment of individuals
reporting private and Medicaid coverage simultaneously (Gruber and
Simon, 2008). Populations with overlapping coverage can be
interpreted in multiple ways, but it has become standard practice to
assume that this group is transitioning from private insurance to
Medicaid. In my analysis, I find little difference in crowd-out measures
accounting and not accounting for the overlap population.
In addition to crowd-out for children and parents, a recent paper
finds evidence of crowd- out among the childless adult population.
Garthwaite et al. (2013) finds that private health insurance coverage
sharply increased for childless adults in conjunction with an increase in
their labor supply after their disenrollment from TennCare, an
extension of Tennessee’s Medicaid program. This implies that childless
adults pursued health coverage through an employer after losing
public coverage and this suggests evidence of crowd-out.3 The results
from Garthwaite et al. (2013) are informative regarding the PPACA
Medicaid expansions since the majority of those who will become
eligible are childless adults. Disabled individuals, though they make up
a smaller portion of the PPACA eligible population, will gain some
eligibility through the expansions. Given their expensive health care
needs, the cost of the PPACA expansions for disabled individuals may
be economically meaningful despite their small population size.

3. Medicaid, Eligibility Expansions, and Eligibility
Pathways for the Disabled
In fiscal year 2010, Medicaid spent $389 billion to provide health
coverage to roughly 60 million low-income Americans (Kaiser Family
3

It should be noted, however, that the results for the TennCare disenrollment are unique in the
literature and several other papers (in particular those on the Oregon Health Insurance
Experiment) do not find big changes in employment due to health insurance (Baicker et al.,
2013).
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Foundation: statehealthfacts.org). The program is means-tested and
jointly funded by both federal and state governments with the federal
government covering at least half of all Medicaid spending for each
state (Kaiser Family Foundation: statehealthfacts.org).4 States are
responsible for the administration of their own Medicaid programs, but
are required to meet minimum federal requirements in terms of
services covered and eligibility standards. While Medicaid also covers
groups such as children, pregnant women, parents, and the elderly, I
will focus on the coverage of disabled individuals.
There are several pathways through which disabled people can
become eligible for Medicaid coverage. I impute eligibility based only
on three pathways where an individual qualifies for coverage by having
low income and a disability: the Supplemental Security Income
Program (SSI), the State Supplemental Payment Program (SSP), and
poverty-related coverage. SSI and SSP are programs that provide cash
assistance to disabled individuals and typically come with Medicaid
coverage automatically.5 These pathways are accounted for when
imputing eligibility, but there were few changes in the eligibility
standards for these programs from 1995 to 2007 and they do not
provide much variation.
Of the three main eligibility pathways used to impute eligibility in
this paper, poverty- related Medicaid has experienced the greatest
changes recently and generates most of the variation that identifies
the econometric model. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986
(OBRA86) authorized this pathway and gave states the option to
increase the Medicaid income eligibility level for the disabled up to
100% of the federal poverty level (FPL). Prior to the OBRA86, disabled
individuals mainly had to qualify under SSI which required an income
level below 74% FPL of income (Social Security Administration, 2012).
While some states opted into the 100% FPL pathway soon after the

4

The federal reimbursement rate of Medicaid expenses in each state is called the Federal
Medical Assistance percent (FMAP). FMAPs range from 50% to 74.73%. States with lower
incomes per capita relative to the US income per capita receive higher reimbursement rates from
the federal government (Baumrucker, 2010).
5

This is not always the case. 209(b) states are allowed to have stricter standards for eligibility
than SSI standards. Some states also require a separate application for Medicaid in addition to
their SSI application.
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passage of the OBRA86, after this initial round of adoptions, eight
states increased the income eligibility level for the disabled to 100% of
the FPL between 1998 to 2003 period (Bruen et al., 2003). I take
advantage of the variation in timing of adopting the poverty-related
coverage as well as the magnitude of the income eligibility level during
this later enactment period to identify changes in Medicaid take-up and
crowd-out.
There are other pathways for disabled Medicaid eligibility that are
not used for eligibility imputation in this analysis. One such pathway is
a Medically Needy program through which some states provide
Medicaid to disabled individuals with exorbitant medical fees. Another
pathway is a state buy-in program that allows disabled individuals with
incomes above the eligibility levels to purchase Medicaid as an
insurance plan. Buy-in plans required that purchasers be employed
and pay a premium for coverage which is unlike the three pathways
used to impute eligibility. To ensure that buy-in programs are not what
drives my results, I run an additional model that adds buy-in program
indicator variables to the main model.6
The final pathway excluded from eligibility imputation is cost
sharing options with Medicare or dual-eligibles (see the appendix for
more information on these individuals). The benefits package for dualeligibles is not as generous as the package received under other
pathways of eligibility. As a result I treat individuals who qualify for
Medicaid coverage under cost sharing as having an alternative form of
Medicaid and Medicaid participation results in this paper do not
consider Medicare cost sharing recipients.7 See the Appendix for
further information on Medicaid eligibility pathways for the disabled.

6

With the addition of controls for the presence of a Buy-in program the estimates of take-up for
Medicaid and private insurance is 0.404 (0.140) and -0.445 (0.148) respectively. The coefficients
on the Buy-in indicator variable in these models are -0.002 (0.011) and 0.009 (0.015) suggesting
that the presence of a buy-in program had little effect on the Medicaid and Private insurance
take-up rates. State clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
7

Including cost sharing individuals in the analysis produces Medicaid and private take-up
estimates of 0.339 (0.180) and -0.529 (0.213) respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
These estimates suggest a crowd-out point estimate of 156% which is even larger than the
primary specification.
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4. Data and Methodology
Following the approach from Cutler and Gruber (1996) for
measuring the impact of Medicaid expansions on take-up and crowdout, we estimate the following equation

𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝛽1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝛽2 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡

(1)

where i, s, and, t index the individual, state, and year respectively.
The dependent variable, Coverageist, is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if an individual has health coverage of a certain type
(Medicaid, Private, or Uninsured), and equals zero otherwise. The key
variable of interest, Eligibleist, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a
person is eligible for Medicaid coverage and zero otherwise. Xist is a
vector of demographic characteristics including age, education, sex,
race, family size, number of children in the household, and marital
status. The variables 𝛾𝑠 and 𝛿𝑡 are state and year fixed effects
respectively and the final term is a random error.
In order to impute eligibility, we must first determine the Medicaid
standards specific to each state and year. There is no central database
for state Medicaid eligibility policies. Following Brown et al. (2007) and
Coe (2005), I compiled Medicaid eligibility information from numerous
sources.8 With this information, I constructed the income eligibility
limits for disabled Medicaid applicants in each state for all years
between 1996 and 2007. The income eligibility limit is the highest level
of income (as a percent of the federal poverty level) that a disabled
individual can have and still qualify for Medicaid coverage. This is
constructed by taking the most generous of the SSI/209(b), povertyrelated, and SSP pathways available to the disabled in a given state
and year. The 1996 and 2007 income eligibility limits by state are
shown in Table 1.
Using the eligibility standards for each state, we can impute
eligibility for an individual. To do this we use the 1996, 2001, and
2004 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation
8

The specific sources used to construct the upper income threshold of Medicaid eligibility rules
for the aged and disabled were Brown et al. (2005) , Bruen, Wiener, and Thomas (2003), Bruen,
Wiener, Kim, and Miazad (1999), Coe (2005) , Congressional Research Service (1993), De Nardi et
al. (2011), Horvath (1997), Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2010), Kassner
(2000), Mississippi Division of Medicaid (1991-2008), Social Security Administration (1991-2008),
Stone (2002, 2011), and state Medicaid websites.
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(SIPP). Each SIPP panel has 12 waves (interviews) except the 2001
panel which only has nine and surveys at least 40,000 households.
Every four months, the SIPP asks respondents a set of core questions
including information on basic demographics (age, sex, race, etc.),
income, and participation in programs such as Medicaid or
Supplemental Security Income. Respondents are interviewed every
four months, but are asked to report information for each of the four
months in the reference period. Thus the core data in the SIPP are at
the person-month level.9 I limit the analysis, however, to only
observations reported in the fourth reference month due to the
potential for transitions in health coverage or family status only being
reported between interviews (“seams”) rather than between months.
This is consistent with other work on Medicaid using the SIPP
(Hamersma and Kim, 2013; Gruber and Simon, 2008).

4.1 Definition of Disability
The official definition of disability for Medicaid eligibility is the
same definition the Social Security Administration (SSA) employs for
SSI qualification (Families USA, 2001). This definition also applies for
the higher income individuals qualifying under the OBRA86 Medicaid
expansions. Per SSA guidelines an adult is disabled if she has a
“medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that prevents
“substantial gainful activity” and is expected to “result in death” or has
“lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months” (Social Security Administration, 2012). This is a
broad definition that relies heavily on a doctor’s subjective opinion as
to the severity of the condition rather than a decisive cutoff
measurement. Household surveys do not contain a measure of this
exact definition and more often contain information regarding different
difficulties or specific conditions of an individual.

9

Given that the SIPP is a panel data set it is possible that a respondent could have up to 12
interviews in any given pattern. Standard errors throughout the main analysis are clustered at
the state level since the Medicaid expansions vary by the state. When we cluster at the individual
level, however, the standard errors are similar. The individually clustered standard errors for
Medicaid, Private, and Overlap take-up estimates are (0.147), (0.160), and (0.063) respectively.
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The closest measure of disability that is available in both the SIPP
and March CPS are the work disability variables in those surveys.10
These certainly have their limitations in that they are self-reported in
both surveys and individuals may not have a clear conception of
disability or impairment status when answering the question (US
Census Bureau, 2012). Despite these limitations, however, there is
some evidence to document that disability trends in work disability
status may be related to disability trends measured by impairment
status. This suggests that though the work disability measure is not
perfect it is correlated with other conceptualizations of disability
(Burkhauser et al., 2003).
Within the SIPP, 85% of individuals aged 20-64 who report having
a work disability have a total personal income less than the average
per capita income in the United States and 65% of these individuals
have incomes less than half the average per capita income. Since
“substantial gainful activity” for disability is commonly measured in
terms of an income cutoff, the work disabled sample appears to be
identifying a population that may have difficulties performing
substantial gainful activity. Measurement error for this disability
definition also does not appear to be related to the Medicaid legislative
changes as individuals were not more likely to report a work disability
after the eligibility expansions went into effect (results not shown).

4.2 Imputing Eligibility
A person is eligible for Medicaid coverage if her personal income
minus income disregarded from eligibility determination is less than
the threshold in a person’s state of residence. Eligibility is defined as a
person’s own eligibility.11 Income considered during eligibility
10

The specific question from the SIPP survey is “Does ... have a physical, mental, or other health
condition that limits the kind or amount of work ... can do at a job or business?” (United States
Census Bureau, 1996). The specific question in the March CPS is “(Do you/Does anyone in this
household) have a health problem or disability which prevents (you/them) from working or
which limits the kind or amount of work (you/they) can do?” (United States Census Bureau,
2012).
11

Gruber and Simon (2008) demonstrated the sensitivity of results to family spillover effects
where a child could benefit from a sibling being Medicaid eligible. Since the sample I am
considering includes working-age disabled adults rather than children and one individual’s
Medicaid status does not influence another’s, I do not use family income to determine eligibility.
I do, however, run an analysis where I include spousal income in eligibility determination. In this
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determination is referred to as countable income and is constructed by
subtracting disregards – any income that is not considered when
determining Medicaid eligibility – from a person’s total income. There
are several types of income that are disregarded from Medicaid
eligibility determination. By federal law, every individual receives an
automatic monthly disregard of $20. Some states (such as California
and Connecticut) choose to disregard larger amounts. Also, income
received through the Supplemental Security Income program does not
count towards Medicaid eligibility.12 In addition to SSI payments, a
portion of earned income is disregarded.13 Subtracting the total
amount of disregards from an individual’s total income produces
countable income for Medicaid eligibility.14
In reality, Medicaid eligibility is determined not only using a
person’s income level but also her financial assets. The SIPP, however,
only contains asset information once a year rather than a monthly
basis like income information. Due to this restriction, my main analysis
does not consider assets when determining eligibility.15 This is a

analysis, a couple is eligible for Medicaid if at least one of them reports having a work disability
and the total income from both individuals is less than the Federal Poverty Level for a family of
size 2. The crowd-out measurements from the spousal analysis are not substantially different
from the individual eligibility analysis. Spousal analysis Medicaid, Private, and Overlap take-up
rates are 0.445 (0.187), -0.532 (0.152), and 0.031 (0.094) respectively. State clustered standard
errors are in parentheses.
12

In the majority of states, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income is automatically eligible
for Medicaid coverage. In 2008, however, there were eleven states that used the 209(b) option
which allowed state Medicaid offices to impose stricter standards on Medicaid eligibility than
federal SSI requirements.
13

$65 plus ½ *(total income earned – 65) per month of earned income is not counted towards
eligibility determination.
14

Given that the income information in the SIPP is self-reported, there is likely measurement
error in the imputed eligibility variable. Hamersma and Kim (2013) proposed an estimation
strategy in which we use the actual Medicaid income threshold (as a percent of the FPL) rather
than imputed eligibility. Following this strategy, I find the effect on Medicaid, Private, and
Overlap insurance to be 0.133 (0.050), -0.150 (0.080), and 0.043 (0.019) respectively. State
clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The Hamersma and Kim strategy take-up rates
suggest similar point estimates as my primary analysis, but only crowd-out estimates accounting
for the overlap group are statistically significant at the 5% level.
15

In an annual analysis, using asset information to determine eligibility does not greatly influence
results.
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restriction that most papers on crowd-out face and assets usually have
not been used in the imputation of eligibility. The SIPP does not
uniquely identify every state and instead groups some states together
in some of its panels. As a result, I drop five states from the analysis
(Maine, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming).
Given the research question, I limit the sample to respondents
within the SIPP who report a work-limiting disability. I eliminate
everyone under the age of 20 (who could potentially qualify for
Medicaid under eligibility rules for children which are more generous)
and the elderly (those over the age of 65, most of who automatically
qualify for Medicare). Across all three panels of the SIPP considered in
this study, 41,554 individuals between 20 and 64 years of age
reported having a work-limiting disability. In 1996, the first year of our
sample, 819 individuals reported a work-limiting disability and had
incomes between 74 and 100% of the FPL and was approximately
1.5% of the working age population in that year. Of these 819
individuals, 37% resided in a state that would eventually expand
Medicaid to the disabled using the OBRA86 option.
Summary statistics for the ineligible and the eligible sample in the
SIPP are presented in Table 2. The observed differences between the
two samples are consistent with previous research. The eligible sample
contains a higher percentage of women, blacks, and those individuals
with lower levels of education which is not surprising as these
characteristics are associated with lower income levels and
disadvantaged populations. As expected, there is a dramatic difference
in income between the ineligible and the eligible samples since this is a
key determinant of eligibility. The eligible group also has higher rates
of Medicaid coverage and uninsurance and are less likely to have
private plans or be on Medicare.
Since the OBRA86 expansions raised Medicaid eligibility levels
above SSI qualification levels, the majority of Medicaid take-up and
crowd-out will be driven by non-SSI recipients. Disabled individuals
through SSI, however, may be inherently different from non-SSI
individuals perhaps due to various health conditions or income levels.
Non-SSI Medicaid recipients, however, constitute a large share of the
disabled Medicaid population. Nearly 40% of disabled Medicaid
enrollment was for non-SSI beneficiaries in 2010
(statehealthfacts.org). This is consistent with summary statistics in the
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SIPP which had 42% of work disabled individuals possessing Medicaid
coverage but not receiving income from SSI. Thus, though the
majority of disabled Medicaid beneficiaries originate from the SSI
program, there is also a fairly large number of non-SSI Medicaid
beneficiaries. Given the size of their population and since the majority
of future Medicaid income-eligibility expansions will apply to them,
take-up and crowd-out rates for the non-SSI disabled are relevant
even if they are inherently different from SSI recipients.
OLS estimates of equation (1) are potentially subject to an omitted
variables bias. Characteristics that determine eligibility for Medicaid
are likely linked with demand for health insurance. Though many of
these characteristics are accounted for in the demographic controls
vector, there may be omitted variables influencing insurance take-up.
Reverse causality may also be a concern within the model. Given that I
am examining a sample of individuals reporting a disability, it is likely
that many of them face difficulties working. Since a large share of
private health coverage is provided through employers, a large portion
of my sample may be less likely to have private coverage due to an
inability to work which also results in lower levels of income. Thus,
there is a potential for a negative spurious relationship between
Medicaid eligibility and health coverage. Since Medicaid eligibility is
also imputed using reported income information from the SIPP,
measurement error is likely present in the model as well.
To account for the omitted variables bias, measurement error, and
reverse causality concerns, I follow Currie and Gruber (1996a and
1996b) and construct a simulated instrument for eligibility. Since my
sample size is small and not computationally overwhelming, I use the
entire sample of disabled respondents from each year to simulate the
instrument rather than select a smaller random sample as has been
done in previous work. Using this national population, the simulated
instrument is constructed as the percent of people that would be
eligible for Medicaid coverage under each state’s individual eligibility
rules for each year. When constructing these shares, I exclude
respondents from the state whose laws are being used to simulate
eligibility (Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005). These percents are then
matched by state and year (based on the eligibility rules that
constructed them) to respondents in the sample.
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By constructing the simulated instrument, we are effectively
producing a measure of Medicaid generosity by state and year that is
not dependent upon the characteristics of the population within a
given state. Instead, the variation in eligibility across state and time
reflects the legislative changes in eligibility rules. Thus, the instrument
depends on changes in state legislation concerning eligibility being
exogenous. Essentially, we want it to be the case that OBRA86
adopting states did not experience different trends in coverage rates
compared to non- adopting states prior to the expansions. In Table 3,
using data from the March CPS, I test the difference between pretrends and post-trends for adopting and non-adopting states. I use
data from the CPS rather than the SIPP because it allows us to observe
a longer period prior to the start of expansions. The data is collapsed
to construct the rate of coverage for the four forms of insurance by
state and year. These rates are then regressed on state and year fixed
effects and two variables that measure the pre- and post-adoption
trends for states. The pre-adoption trend variable is a negative integer
value that indicates the number of years until an expanding state’s
adoption or zero for non-adopting states and years after the
expansion. The post-adoption trend variable is a positive integer value
that indicates the number of years after an expanding state’s adoption
or zero for non-adopting states and years prior to the expansion.
Table 3 presents the regression results for the pre-treatment
analysis. There is no statistically significant difference in the preadoption trends of coverage rates between adopting and non-adopting
states for any of the insurance types and the coefficients are all near
zero. This implies that states experienced little difference in coverage
rate trends leading up to the expansions. The post-adoption trends for
Medicaid and private coverage, however, are statistically significantly
different between adopting and non-adopting states (see Columns 1
and 2 in Table 3). Adopting states experienced an increase in their
Medicaid coverage rates and a decrease in their private insurance
rates relative to non-adopting states after the eligibility expansions
went into effect. The post-adoption coverage trends for Medicare and
uninsurance are not statistically significantly different between the two
types of states. These results are indicative of crowd-out though the
magnitudes of the coefficients in this analysis do not suggest that
crowd-out was complete. Overall, the results contained in Table 3
indicate that pre-adoption coverage rate trends were similar for
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adopting and non-adopting states and support the validity of the
instrument, but by no means are a sufficient condition for no
endogeneity.

5. Results
5.1 Tabular Results
Following earlier literature, we first construct difference-indifference measures of crowd-out using a tabular approach. The top
section of Table 4 contains the changes in health insurance coverage
from 1996 (the beginning of our sample) to 2007 (the end of our
sample) across four income groups using the work disability sample of
the SIPP. In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of our crowd-out
results to individuals who report possessing both private and Medicaid
insurance coverage at the same time, we define three forms of health
coverage: Medicaid only, private only, and overlapping coverage
(Gruber and Simon, 2008).16 In addition to changes in health
coverage, Table 4 also reports changes in imputed eligibility for each
income group. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at
the state level.
Given that the OBRA86 expansions effectively raised the income
thresholds for Medicaid eligibility from 74 to 100% of the FPL, we
expect individuals with countable incomes within this range to be the
most affected by the expansion. Table 4 suggests that this is the case.
The lower section of Table 4 reports difference-in-difference estimates
of eligibility and health coverage from the 74-100% FPL income group
relative to three other income categories (less than 74% FPL, between
100-150% FPL, and greater than 150% FPL). Table 4 also compares
the 74-100% FPL group to all three of these other groups combined.
Imputed Medicaid eligibility for the 74 to 100% FPL group increased by
about 20 percentage points relative to every other income group from
1996 to 2007. The rate of eligibility remained virtually unchanged for
the other income groups across the time period. Coverage by Medicaid
displays a similar pattern as eligibility. Relative to the other income
16

Coverage definitions for the tabulation results only take into account various forms of private
and Medicaid coverage. Individuals may have alternative forms of coverage (such as military
insurance or Medicare), but these are not accounted for in the coverage definitions for this
analysis. These alternative forms are considered in a later robustness analysis.
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groups, Medicaid coverage increased between 9.0 to 12.4 percentage
points for the 74-100% FPL income group and 10.4 percentage points
relative to all other income groups combined. All income groups
experienced a reduction in private coverage over the time period, but
the largest decrease was for the 74 to 100% FPL group. The change in
overlap coverage is similar across all income groups.
Table 5 presents crowd-out measures resulting from the tabular
results in Table 4. Following Gruber and Simon (2008), we construct
one measure of crowd-out that ignores the overlap group and another
measure of crowd-out which interprets the overlap coverage as a
transition from private to Medicaid coverage. Table 5 presents crowdout estimates ranging from 16 to 80% that appear to be insensitive to
the treatment of the overlap group. Standard errors are in parentheses
and are calculated from the difference-in-difference estimates using
the delta method. Relative to all of the other income groups combined,
the rate of crowd-out was between 54 to 60% which is consistent with
the crowd-out estimates in the children’s Medicaid expansions (Gruber
and Simon, 2008). The 95% confidence intervals for these estimates
allow us to rule out a crowd-out rate below 29% and above 85%.
OLS estimates are consistent with the range of crowd-out levels
implied by the Diff-in- Diff tabulation estimates though slightly smaller.
Crowd-out measures from OLS estimates are between 49 to 53% (see
results in Table 6). Though the tabulation and OLS estimates provide
us with a general idea of changes in coverage and crowd-out, they are
likely to be biased and we proceed accordingly with an instrumental
variables analysis.

5.2 Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimates
Table 7 presents 2SLS estimates that correspond to Equation 1.
The key covariate in these models is the variable, Eligible, the
indicator variable for whether an individual is imputed to be eligible for
Medicaid, is the dependent variable in these regressions. We
instrument for this with the simulated eligibility variable and the firststage estimates are reported in column (1). All models include state,
year, and SIPP panel-wave fixed effects, age, age squared, female
sex, black race, Hispanic origin, marital status, less than high school
education, high school diploma, a cubic in income, and a state-year
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linear trend as additional controls.17 Standard errors allow for arbitrary
correlation in errors within a state. It is no surprise that simulated
eligibility and imputed eligibility are positively correlated. Indeed, firststage estimates in column (1) suggest a large positive effect on the
likelihood of being Medicaid eligible with more generous Medicaid
programs (as measured by the simulated instrument). First-stage
estimates indicate that for a 10 percentage point increase in simulated
eligibility, there will be a 7.32 percentage point increase in actual
eligibility. The coefficient on the instrument is statistically significant at
the 1% level and the F-statistic for the null of the coefficient on the
instrument is 24.
The final four columns of Table 7 presents 2SLS estimates from
the SIPP for various forms of insurance coverage using simulated
Medicaid eligibility as an instrument for Medicaid eligibility. We
consider the effects of Medicaid eligibility on the same forms of
coverage as in the tabulation analysis and also on whether an
individual is uninsured.18 The effects on Medicaid only, private only,
and overlap coverage do not need to sum to the effect on the
uninsured due to potential joint coverage under Medicare or military
insurance. We explore these possibilities in a robustness check later in
the paper.
The key variable of interest is Eligible, which measures the effects
of Medicaid eligibility on the four forms of coverage. Column (2) of
Table 7 presents the results for Medicaid only participation. Results
suggest a 41% take-up rate for Medicaid after the eligibility
expansions. This means that for every 100 individuals made eligible
through the expansion, 41 chose to take up Medicaid coverage. In
conjunction with this increase in Medicaid coverage, there is a roughly
equivalent decrease in private coverage. Estimates suggest that 45
individuals lose private coverage for every one hundred who become
eligible for Medicaid. Coverage for the overlap group increases by 0.15
percentage points for every ten percentage point increase in Medicaid
eligibility but is statistically insignificant. Including the effects from the
17

SIPP panel-wave fixed effects were included in the regressions to account for differences in
interview structures. Excluding these fixed effects does not greatly affect the results.
18

We define a respondent to be uninsured if she reports no coverage from Medicaid, private,
military, or Medicare insurance.
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overlap group implies a Medicaid take-up rate of 42% and a private
coverage reduction rate of 46.5%. The rate of uninsurance increases
by 1.11 percentage points for every ten percentage point increase in
Medicaid eligibility though this result is not statistically significant.
Table 8 presents the crowd-out estimates implied by the take-up
rates in Table 7. For the purposes of this paper, we define crowd-out
to be the change in private insurance coverage relative to the change
in Medicaid coverage.19 The results in the No Overlap column (1)
ignores any effects from the overlap group while the Overlap column
(2) accounts for the overlap group by assuming its effect represents a
transition from private insurance to Medicaid. Crowd-out measures
appear to be insensitive to the treatment of the overlap group. The
SIPP estimates suggest complete crowd-out between 110 to 111%.
Measures of crowd-out are statistically significant at the 5% level for
both the overlap and no overlap groups using bootstrapped confidence
intervals.20 The confidence intervals allow us to reject the hypothesis
that crowd-out was equal to zero at a 5% level in the SIPP and also
allow us to reject crowd-out rates lower than 26% and higher than
390%. Given that the 95% confidence intervals suggest a broad range
of crowd-out estimates, we need to interpret the crowd-out point
estimate with caution. The intervals do suggest, however, that crowdout for the disabled was substantial. In a later robustness check, I
derive a similarly large point estimate of crowd-out using an
alternative sample from the March CPS. Since the estimates across the
two samples are similar, this is suggestive that crowd-out in the
disabled population was near 100%.
The crowd-out measure and take-up rates for the disabled
population in the 2SLS analysis are much larger than what has been
previously found for other populations such as children and their
19

Some crowd-out literature defines an alternative measure of crowd-out to be the percent
change in Medicaid that is not associated with a reduction in the uninsurance rate. Since the
analysis always finds an increase in the uninsurance rate, the alternative measure always
suggests a crowd-out rate of over 100%.
20

Following the methods of Gruber and Simon (2008) we construct confidence intervals for the
crowd-out measures using a clustered bootstrap with 350 replications. For each of the 350
replications we construct crowd-out measures accounting for and not accounting for the overlap
group. We then take the 5th and 95th percentile of the constructed crowd-out measures to
create the confidence intervals.
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parents. There are several reasons this might be the case. First, the
disabled are more likely to experience larger total healthcare expenses
than children due to their chronic medical conditions requiring
continuing treatment. Given this, private insurance plans for the
disabled may have larger premiums, coinsurance, or deductibles
making Medicaid insurance plans (which are free) a more attractive
option.21
Second, disabled individuals may use the Medicaid expansions as a
method of pursuing Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). Since
most private health insurance is provided through an employer, the
two year waiting period for Medicare coverage might discourage
disabled individuals from securing SSDI coverage due to the “job lock”
phenomenon. With the possibility of Medicaid coverage now available
to them during the waiting period, individuals may have more
incentive to leave their jobs (which often provide income above SSDI
qualification levels) and take-up SSDI. If the majority of Medicaid
take-up originates from individuals pursuing SSDI, then after the two
year waiting period, costs to the Medicaid program will decrease as
these individuals qualify for coverage through Medicare. Costs to SSDI
will increase, however, as they have to provide Medicare for more
participants. We leave detailed analysis of any increases in SSDI
participation to future work.

5.3 Robustness
The basic results in Table 7 are robust to several alternative
samples. We find similar effects of Medicaid expansions on public and
private insurance coverage using the 1997 through 2008 March CPS
from the Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). The CPS is
an annual, nationally representative survey that contains information
on income, family structure, and health insurance status for the year
prior to the interview. Similar to the SIPP analysis, the CPS sample is

21

It is puzzling that all disabled individuals in the sample would choose to remain uninsured
rather than accept Medicaid coverage. About sixteen percent of the disabled sample is uninsured
which is not incredibly different from the insurance rate of the overall population during this
time period. One possible explanation is that individuals with disabilities are more strongly
influenced by social stigma than other types of individuals. Another explanation could be that
disabled individuals lack the knowledge or ability to pursue the Medicaid application which is
often a lengthy and complicated process.
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restricted to contain individuals between the ages of 20 and 64 who
report having a work disability. We also drop all observations from the
five states which are not uniquely identified within the SIPP. Thus, the
SIPP and March CPS samples should represent similar populations. We
impute Medicaid eligibility as we did in the SIPP analysis but adjust for
annual Medicaid income limits and disregards to account for the yearly
observations of the CPS. Simulated eligibility is constructed similarly
except it is now at a state and year level.
Panel A of Table 9 reports two-stage-least-squares health
insurance coverage estimates using the sample from the March CPS.
The models in Table 9, Panel A have the same controls on the right
side of the equation as in the SIPP analysis except they do not control
for panel-wave fixed effects, which are specific to the survey structure
of the SIPP. The health coverage variables (Medicaid only, Private
only, Overlap, and Uninsurance) are defined the same as in the SIPP
analysis.22 All estimates in Table 9, Panel A are weighted using the
State Health Access Data Assistance Center’s (SHADAC) summary
health insurance weight in the March CPS.
Results in Table 9, Panel A for the CPS analysis suggest a Medicaid
take-up rate of 25% accompanied by a private reduction rate of 22%.
These rates are lower in magnitude than what was found in the SIPP
analysis but may be partially explained by the longer recall period of
the CPS. The Medicaid take-up rate and private reduction rates
reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 9, Panel A only account for
changes in individuals reporting a single form of coverage for an entire
year. The yearly observations in the CPS do not identify transitions in
coverage as well as the monthly level data of the SIPP. As a result,
individuals who experience transitions from one type of insurance to
another are much more likely to appear in the overlap group in the
CPS than in the SIPP. The increased likelihood of overlapping coverage
potentially results in lower take-up rates for those reporting a single
22

Health coverage variables for the CPS analysis are constructed using the health insurance
summary variables produced by the State Health Access Data Assistance Center (SHADAC)
contained within the IPUMS version of the CPS. The CPS updated their survey questionnaire in
1999 with a verification question to address the underreporting of health insurance. The
verification question asked those who had not reported health coverage earlier in the survey
about their health coverage again and allowed respondents a second chance to report forms of
health coverage. SHADAC then imputed health insurance variables in the CPS prior to 1999 to
account for the verification question.
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form of coverage, but larger take-up rates for those reporting two
forms of coverage (i.e. private and Medicaid) in the CPS data. Indeed,
the CPS estimate of the effect of Medicaid eligibility on overlap
coverage is larger than the SIPP. If we account for this effect by
interpreting it as a transition from private coverage to Medicaid, then
the CPS estimates are closer to the level of the SIPP estimates but are
still slightly lower in magnitude. This is consistent with Ham and
Shore-Sheppard (2005) which found that take-up rates were more
similar across the CPS and SIPP when SIPP responses were annualized
to be more like CPS data. When we account for the overlap group, the
CPS estimates suggest a crowd- out rate of 90% which is reasonably
close to the SIPP estimates of crowd-out. A 95% bootstrapped
confidence interval, however, does not allow us to reject the null
hypothesis for CPS estimates. The effect on uninsurance in column (5)
of Table 9 Panel A is larger and statistically significant in the CPS
suggesting a 1.31 percentage point increase for a 10 percentage point
increase in Medicaid eligibility. There is no clear explanation as to why
the uninsurance rate appears to be worsening in both samples. This is
a focus of future work.
In order to qualify for Medicaid under the OBRA86 expansion, an
individual must not only have a low level of income they must also be
disabled. Though the definition of a self- reported work-limiting
disability in the SIPP is probably less stringent than what is used by
the government to determine disability status, it does identify a group
of people likely to qualify for disability services. Since work disabilities
in the SIPP are self-reported, we may be concerned that the Medicaid
expansions increased the incentive to report a disability and resulted in
a compositional shift of the sample across the time period. I find no
evidence of an effect of eligibility on the likelihood of being workdisabled (results not shown) suggesting that becoming eligible for
Medicaid did not induce a person to report a work disability.23
As a robustness test, we perform the same analysis as in Table 7
using non-work disabled individuals in the 1996, 2001, and 2004

23

To test this, I run a 2SLS regression of an indicator for a reported work-related disability on an
indicator for whether a respondent would be financially eligible for Medicaid using the same
controls in my main analysis. The estimated effect of Medicaid financial eligibility on the
likelihood of reporting disability status is -0.022 with a standard error of 0.065.

Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

20

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

panels of the SIPP. The results for this analysis are presented in Table
9, Panel B. There is no significant Medicaid take-up by non-work
disabled individuals who would qualify for Medicaid based on their
income alone (see column (2), Table 9, Panel B). In fact, the sign on
the coefficient suggests there was a slight reduction in Medicaid
participation for working age non-work disabled individuals though this
result is not statistically significant. Medicaid eligibility also has small
statistically insignificant effects on the other forms of coverage (Private
only, Overlap, and Uninsured) for the non-work disabled. This supports
the specification being properly identified.
One concern with the panel nature of the SIPP is the possibility of
attrition bias. The response rates at the initial interview of each SIPP
panel are higher than later interviews. We may be concerned that a
select group of people choose not to respond or enter the dataset in
later interviews and this influences the overall results. To account for
this problem, we construct a baseline sample by keeping only
observations from the first three waves of each panel and respondents
who were present for the original interview (i.e. all entrants after the
first wave of the panel are excluded). Table 9, Panel C displays the
results from this restricted sample. Overall, the point estimates for
private only coverage and Medicaid remain virtually unaffected though
the estimates are less precise given the decrease in sample size and
the effect on private insurance coverage loses statistical significance.
The attrition sample also only contains observations from 3 years of
data from my 12 year study period which does not allow us to take full
advantage of the Medicaid eligibility expansions that vary by year.
Despite their lack of statistical significance and poor precision, the
point estimates of the effects on insurance coverage in the attrition
analysis remain considerably close to the estimates of my main
specification. This demonstrates that the results of the study are not
being driven by attriters or entrants in the SIPP panels.
Another potential concern with the disabled population is its
increased likelihood of being covered through Medicare. In earlier
crowd-out studies for children, Medicare coverage was ignored given
children’s low tendency to be covered through this program. Crowdout literature has focused on the treatment of the overlap population
for private and Medicaid coverage. We might also be concerned with
the overlap population considering Medicare coverage. That is, we
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might want to account for individuals who report Medicaid and
Medicare coverage or private and Medicare coverage in addition to
private and Medicaid coverage.24 The interpretation for Medicare
overlap groups will be different from the Medicaid-private overlap
group. Given that Medicaid is a fully comprehensive plan, there is no
need for Medicaid recipients to possess private coverage while covered
by Medicaid. This is the basis for the original overlap assumption of a
transition from private to public coverage. Medicare, though generous,
is not completely comprehensive, however, and individuals often hold
either supplementary private or Medicaid coverage to fill the gaps.25
Table 10 presents the results accounting for these additional
Medicare overlap groups. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 present the
results for private only (now no Medicaid or Medicare) and Medicaid
only (now no private or Medicare) coverage. The results in column (2)
of Table 10 suggests the increase in Medicaid coverage with no private
or Medicare coverage is 2.39 percentage points for every 10
percentage point increase in eligibility. This is roughly equivalent to
the decrease in private coverage with no Medicaid or Medicare
coverage. Considering only these two groups, crowd-out remains large
and consistent with the earlier specification (115%). Turning to the
Medicare overlap groups, there is a 1.78 percentage point decrease in
Private-Medicare coverage for every 10 percentage point increase in
Medicaid eligibility. This is slightly larger in magnitude than the
increase in Medicaid-Medicare coverage which increases by 1.67
percentage points for a 10 percentage point increase in Medicaid
eligibility. If we consider only these two coverage forms, the estimates
imply a crowd-out rate of 107%. Bootstrapped confidence intervals for
crowd-out rates with and without Medicare coverage are wide and do
not allow us to rule out zero crowd-out. Given the similarity in the
magnitudes of the opposite signed coefficients of Medicaid only and
private only and likewise Medicaid-Medicare and private-Medicare,
however, the results suggest that individuals are choosing to take-up

24

Very few individuals report all three forms of coverage in the same month in the SIPP.

25

For Medicare eligible individuals, Medicare will always cover first-order expenses and Medicaid
will cover any remaining charges.
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Medicaid coverage over private coverage either as an individual policy
or as a supplementary plan for Medicare.26

6. Conclusion
Despite the large cost and important Medicaid eligibility changes
affecting the working age disabled population, little literature has
examined the effects of Medicaid eligibility on insurance coverage for
this group. In this paper, I fill this void by investigating a Medicaid
eligibility expansion which allowed states the option to enroll disabled
individuals with incomes up to 100% of the federal poverty level in
Medicaid. Estimates of crowd-out range from 50 to 100% (OLS and
2SLS specifications, respectively). The 2SLS estimates suggest that all
new Medicaid enrollees through the expansions dropped a private plan
in favor of public coverage. The confidence interval around the 2SLS
point estimate is wide, however, and should be interpreted cautiously,
I find a similarly large point estimate of crowd-out using an alternative
sample derived from the March CPS further supporting that crowd-out
among the disabled population was substantial. Using population and
disability rate information from 2008 (the year after the end of my
study period), I estimate that these expansions cost at most between
2.92 to 3.03 billion dollars.27 We rely on the average cost of a disabled
Medicaid recipient to construct these estimates, but it is likely that the
newly eligible are not as expensive at the margin as the average
disabled Medicaid recipient. Thus, we should think of 3 billion dollars
as an upper bound of the cost of the expansions.
The analysis of these expansions is especially relevant given the
enactment of the Medicaid expansions under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act in 2014. For states who accept the current terms
of the PPACA, Medicaid eligibility levels will increase to include
individuals under the age of 65 who have incomes less than 138% of
26

If we interpret the overlap group between all three types of coverage as a transition to
Medicaid Medicare- supplementary plans from Private Medicare-Supplementary plans, then
crowd-out measures remain similar (130%).
27

In 2008, approximately 15,000,000 individuals between the ages of 20 and 64 reported having
a working limiting disability. Eligibility increased by roughly 3 percentage points at the peak of
the expansions implying that close to 450,000 disabled people became eligible for Medicaid
coverage. Using the estimated take-up rates (between 41 and 42%) and an average cost per
disabled beneficiary of $15,840 (in FY 2008) this suggests that the expansions cost
450,000*0.41*15,840=$2.92 billion.
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the Federal Poverty Level. In 2008, the average income eligibility level
for the disabled was 87% of the Federal Poverty Level across all
states. Given the expansions imposed by the PPACA, we can expect
more disabled individuals to become eligible for Medicaid in 2014.
Disabled individuals qualifying through the overall Medicaid expansions
of the PPACA are likely healthier on the margin than individuals
qualifying through SSI. Given this, my estimates of total costs
represent an upper bound, but are still informative as to the potential
costs of the Medicaid expansion.
It is important to note that though I find the potential for fiscal
consequences from these expansions, the results say nothing about
any potential health benefits gained through the increased Medicaid
take-up. Even though individuals are less reliant on private health
insurance, they may experience benefits to health from receiving
public coverage. First, private health insurance plans may not cover all
services while Medicaid coverage provides for most procedures
suggesting that individuals could gain access to medical techniques
previously unavailable to them and improve overall physical health.
Second, since Medicaid is a low cost (if not free) policy with virtually
no copays or deductibles, individuals may benefit from having
additional resources available for consumption. For many of these
individuals, coverage through the Medicaid program will greatly lessen
financial strain and can have an effect on mental health or overall
happiness (Finkelstein et. al., 2012). Another potential benefit of
disabled Medicaid coverage is that sicker individuals will leave
employer group plans and result in smaller or slower growing
insurance premiums for the privately insured individuals who remain
on the plan.
There are some potential health detriments to Medicaid coverage,
however. Due to low reimbursement rates, not all physicians will
accept Medicaid coverage and beneficiaries are restricted to a limited
group of health providers and may experience access problems. For
adults with public health insurance, healthcare access is slightly worse
than patients with private insurance (Government Accounting Office,
2012). There is also some evidence that the quality of care is worse
for patients with public insurance compared with private insurance, but
this difference is small (Weissman et al., 2013). Given these potential
health benefits and detriments it is important to examine health
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outcomes in conjunction with the fiscal consequences. We leave the
analysis of health outcomes to future work.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank William Evans, Daniel Hungerman, James Sullivan,
Ethan Lieber, Thomas DeLeire, Mark Duggan, the co-editor, two anonymous
referees, and seminar participants at the University of Notre Dame.

References
Aizer, A. & Grogger, J. (2003). Parental Medicaid expansions and child
Medicaid coverage. NBER Working Paper # 9907.
Anderson, W.L, Armour, B.S., Finkelstein, E.A., & Wiener, J.M. (2010).
Estimates of state-level health-care expenditures associated with
disability. Public Health Reports 125, 44-51.
Autor, D. H. & Duggan, M. G. (2003). The rise in the disability roles and the
decline in unemployment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1),
157-205.
. (2006). The growth in the social security disability rolls: a fiscal crisis
unfolding. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(3), 71-96.
. (2007). Distinguishing income from substitution effects in disability
insurance. The American Economic Review 97(2), 119-124.
Baicker, K., Finkelstein, A., Song J., & Taubman, S. (2013). The impact of
Medicaid on labor force activity and program participation: Evidence
from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. NBER Working Paper
#19547
Baumrucker, E. (2010). Medicaid: The Federal Medical Assistance Percetange
(FMAP). Congressional Research Service.
Blumberg, L.J, Dubay, L. & Norton, S.A. (2000). Did the Medicaid expansions
for children displace private insurance? An analysis using the SIPP.
Journal of Health Economics 19(1), 33–60.
Brown, J.R., Coe, N. & Finkelstein, A. (2007). Medicaid crowd-out of private
long-term care insurance demand: evidence from the Health and
Retirement Survey. Tax Policy and the Economy 21, 1-34.
Bruen, B.K., Wiener, J.M., Kim, J. & Miazad, O. (1999). State usage of
Medicaid coverage options for aged blind, and disabled people.
Assessing the New Federalism Discussion Papers.

Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

25

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Bruen, B.K., Wiener, J.M., & Thomas, S. (2003). Medicaid eligibility policy for
aged, blind, and disabled beneficiaries. The Urban Institute.
Buettgens, M. (2011). Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM)
Methodology Documentation. The Urban Institute.
Burkhauser, R.V., Houtenville, A.J., & Wittenburg, D.C. (2003). A user guide
to current statistics on the employment of people with disabilities.
Rehabilitation Research and Training Center for Economic Research on
Employment Policy for Persons with Disabilities.
Card, D. & Shore-Sheppard, L. (2004). Using discontinuous eligibility rules to
identify the effects of the federal medicaid expansions on low income
children. Review of Economics and Statistics 86(3), 752–766.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Disability and Health Data
System (DHDS). Updated March 2011; cited 2006. Available from:
http://dhds.cdc.gov.
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (2010). 2010. 2010 Actuarial
Report: On the financial outlook for Medicaid. United States
Department of Health and Human Services.
. (2009). National health expenditure fact sheet. Retrieved July 28,
2012 from https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet.html.
. (2012). Medicaid benefits. Retrieved from
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP- Program-Information/ByTopics/Benefits/Medicaid-Benefits.html
Coburn, A.F., Long, S.H., & Marquis, M.S. (1999). Effects of changing
Medicaid fees on physician participation and enrollee access. Inquiry
36(3), 265-279.
Coe, N.B. (2005). Financing nursing home care: New evidence on spenddown behavior. MIT dissertation.
Congressional Research Service. (1993). Medicaid Source Book: Background
data and analysis.
Currie, J., Decker, S. & Wanchuan L. (2008). Has public health insurance for
older children reduced disparities in access to care and health
outcomes? Journal of Health Economics 27, 1567-1581.
Currie, J. & Gruber, J. (1996a). Health insurance eligibility, utilization of
medical care, and child health. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111,
431–466.
Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

26

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

. (1996b). Saving Babies: The efficacy and cost of recent changes in
the Medicaid eligibility of pregnant women. Journal of Political
Economy, 104(6), 1263-1296.
Currie, J., Gruber, J., & Fischer, M. (1995). Physician payments and infant
health: Effect of increases in Medicaid reimbursement. American
Economic Review 85, 106-111.
Cutler, D. & Gruber, J. (1996). Does public health insurance crowd-out private
insurance? Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 391–430.
Dafny, L. & Gruber, J. (2005). Public insurance and child hospitalizations:
Access and efficiency effects. Journal of Public Economics, 89(1), 109129.
Davern, M., Klerman, J.A., Baugh, D.K., Call, K.T., & Greenberg, G.D. (2009).
An examination of the Medicaid undercount in the current population
survey: preliminary results from record linking. Health Services
Research 44(3), 965-987.
De Nardi, M., French, E., Jones, J.B., & Gooptu, A. (2011). Medicaid and the
elderly. NBER Working Paper # 17689.
Dubay, L.C. & Kenney, G. (1996). Revisiting the issues: the effects of
Medicaid expansions on insurance coverage of children. The Future of
Children 6(1), 152–161.
Dubay, L.C. & Kenney, G. (1997). Did Medicaid expansions for pregnant
women crowd-out private insurance? Health Affairs 16(1), 185–193.
Duggan, M., Singleton, P., & Song, J. (2007). Aching to retire? The rise in the
full retirement age and its impact on the social security disability rolls.
Journal of Public Economics 91, 1327-1350.
Duggan, M., & Imberman, S.A. (2009). Why are the disability rolls
skyrocketing? The contribution of population characteristics, economic
conditions, and program generosity. In (D.M. Cutler & D.A. Wise,
Eds.). Health at Older Ages: The Causes and Consequences of
Declining Disability among the Elderly. (pp. 337-379). University of
Chicago Press.
Families USA. (2001). Could your state do more to expand Medicaid for
seniors and adults with disabilities? Expanding Medicaid: State options.
Washington D.C.
Finkelstein, A., Taubman, S., Wright, B. Bernstein, M., Gruber, J., Newhouse,
J.P., Allen, H., Baicker, K. & Oregon Health Study Group. (2012). The

Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

27

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the first year.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(3), 1057-1106.
Fleming, C. (2010). Medicaid spending growth exceeds expectations. Health
Affairs Blog. Retrieved July 27, 2012 from
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/09/30/medicaid- spending-growthexceeds-expectations/.
Garthwaite, C. (2012). The doctor might see you now: the supply side effects
of public health insurance expansions. American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy 4(3), 190-215.
Garthwaite, C., Gross, T. & Notowidigdo, M.J. (2013). Public health insurance,
labor supply, and employment lock. NBER Working Paper No. 19220.
Grabowski, D.C., Ohsfeldt, R.L., & Morrisey, M.A. (2003). Inquiry – Excellus
Health Plan 40(2), 146-157.
Gruber, J. & Simon, K. (2008). Crowd-out 10 years later: Have recent public
insurance expansions crowded out private health insurance? Journal of
Health Economics, 27, 201- 217.
Gruber, J. & Kubik, J. (2002). Health insurance coverage and the disability
insurance Application Decision. NBER Working Paper No. 9148.
Ham, J. & Shore-Sheppard, L. (2005). The effect of Medicaid expansions for
low-income children on Medicaid participation and private insurance
coverage: evidence from the SIPP. Journal of Public Economics 89, 57–
83.
Hamersma, S. (2010). The effects of Medicaid earnings limits on earnings
growth among poor workers. Working Paper.
Hamersma, S. & Kim, M. (2013). Participation and crowd out: Assessing the
effects of parental Medicaid expansions. Journal of Health Economics
32, 160-171.
Herz, E.J., Hearne, J., Stone, J., Tritz, K., Baumrucker, E.P., Scott, C.,
Peterson, C.L., Grady, A., and Rimkunas, R. (2006). How Medicaid
Works – Program Basics. January 4, 2006 Update. Congressional
Research Service.
Holahan, J., Buettgens, M, Carroll, C. & Dorn, S. (2012). The cost and
coverage implications of the ACA Medicaid expansion: National and
state-by-state analysis – Executive Summary. Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured. Retrieved August 29, 2013 from
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8384_es.p
df

Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

28

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Horvath, J. (1997). Medicaid financial eligibility for aged, blind, and disabled:
Survey of state use of selected options. National Academy for State
Health Policy
Hudson, J., Selden, T. & Banthin, J. (2005). Impact of SCHIP on insurance
coverage of children. Inquiry 42(3), 232–254.
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2008). Medicaid: A timeline of key developments.
Retrieved July 27, 2012 from
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/5-02-13medicaid-timeline.pdf.
. (2012). Quick take: Who benefits from the ACA Medicaid expansion?
Retrieved August 22, 2013 from http://kff.org/health-reform/factsheet/who-benefits-from-the-aca- medicaid-expansion/
. (2014). Status of state action on the Medicaid expansion decision,
2014. Retrieved June 5, 2014 from http://kff.org/health-reform/stateindicator/state-activity-around-expanding- medicaid-under-theaffordable-care-act/#
Kaiser Family Foundation: statehealthfacts.org. Medicaid & CHIP data.
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. (2010). Medicaid financial
eligibility: primary pathways for the elderly and people with
disabilities. Kaiser Family Foundation.
Kassner, E. & Shirley, L. (2000). Medicaid financial eligibility for older people:
State variations in access to home and community-based waiver and
nursing home services.” The Public Policy Institute, AARP.
King, M., Ruggles, S., Alexander, J.T., Flood, S., Genadek, K., Schroeder,
M.B., Rampe, B., & Vick, R. (2010). Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0. [Machine-readable
database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center [producer
and distributor].
Lakdawalla, D.N., Bhattacharya, J. & Goldman, D.P. (2004). Are the young
becoming more disabled? Health Affairs 23(1), 168-176.
Livermore, G., Stapleton, D. & Claypool, H. (2009). Health insurance and
health care access before and after SSDI entry. Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc.
LoSasso, A. & Buchmueller, T. (2004). The effect of the state children’s health
insurance program on health insurance coverage. Journal of Health
Economics 23, 1059–1082.

Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

29

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

McIsaac, C. (2011). Insuring Arizona: Preserving AHCCCS coverage in a
challenging economy. Arizona Chamber Foundation Policy Brief.
Meyer, B.D. & Wherry, L. R. (2012). Saving teens: using a policy discontinuity
to estimate the effects of Medicaid eligibility. NBER Working Paper
18309.
Mississippi Division of Medicaid. (1991-2008). Annual Report.
Mitchell, J.B. (1991). Physician participation in Medicaid revisited. Medical
Care 29(7), 645- 653.
Smith, V. K., Gifford, K., Ellis, E., Rudowitz, R., and Snyder, L. (2011).
Moving ahead amid fiscal challenges: A look at Medicaid spending,
coverage and policy trends. Results from a 50-state Medicaid budget
survey for state fiscal years 2011 and 2012. Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured.
Shore-Sheppard, L. D. "Stemming the tide? The effect of expanding Medicaid
eligibility on health insurance." The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis
& Policy 8, 2 (2008): Article 6.
Social Security Administration. (2012). Understanding Supplemental Security
Income. Retrieved July 27, 2012 from http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/textunderstanding-ssi.htm.
. (1991-2008). State assistance programs for SSI recipients. SSA
Publication No. 13- 11975.
Stone, J.L. (2002). Medicaid: Eligibility for the aged and disabled. Report for
Congress. Congressional Research Service.
. (2011). Medicaid eligibility for persons age 65+ and individuals with
disabilities: 2009 state profiles. Congressional Research Service.
Thorpe, K. & Florence, C. (1998). Health insurance coverage among children:
the role of expanded Medicaid coverage. Inquiry 35(4), 369–379.
United States Census Bureau. (2012). Disability: CPS Annual Social and
Economics Supplement (CPS ASEC). Retrieved January 21, 2014 from
http://www.census.gov/people/disability/methodology/cps.html.
_____ . (1996). Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 Panel
Wave 1 Core Microdata File.
United States Department of Health and Human Services. (2009). The 2009
HHS Federal Poverty Guidelines. Retrieved July 28, 2012 from
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/09poverty.shtml/09fedreg.shtml.

Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

30

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

United States Department of Labor. (2012). FAQs for employees about
COBRA continuation health coverage. Retrieved September 18, 2012
from http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq- consumer-cobra.html
United States Government Accountability Office. (2012). States made multiple
program changes, and beneficiaries generally reported access
comparable to private insurance. Report to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.
Urban Institute. Transfer Income Model 3 Documentation – Medicaid version
65.1. Retrieved July 28, 2012 from
http://trim3.urban.org/documentation/Medicaid/Main.php.
Weissman, J.S., Vogeli, C., & Levy, D.E. (2013). The quality of hospital care
for Medicaid and private pay patients. Medical Care, 51(5), 389-395.
Yazici, E. & Kaestner, R. (2000). Medicaid expansions and the crowding out of
private health insurance among children. Inquiry 37(Spring 1), 23–32.
Yelowitz, A.S. (1995). The Medicaid notch, labor supply, and welfare
participation: Evidence from eligibility expansions. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 110(4), 909-939.
Zuckerman, S., McFeeters, J., Cunningham, P., & Nichols, L. (2004). Changes
in Medicaid physician fees, 1998-2003: implications for physician
participation. Health Affairs, 23(4), 374-384.

Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

31

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Table 1.

Medicaid upper income thresholds for the disabled population: 1996 and

2007.

Bold and italicized states are those using the 209(b) option.
* Arizona offers Medicaid eligibility for those at or below 100% FPL through the
Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System. This system was formed through a
special demonstration waiver (Section 1115). Massachusetts extends Medicaid
eligibility even further to 133% FPL using a Section 1115 demonstration as well.
** Hawaii and Alaska have higher federal poverty levels than the continental United
States. The upper income limits for these two states are constructed relative to the
poverty level of the 48 remaining states.
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Table 2:

Summary Statistics for SIPP Individuals Reporting a Work Disability by

Eligibility Status.

Summary statistics are weighted using the individual weight in the 1996, 2001, and
2004 SIPP panels. I can reject the null at a P-value of 0.01 that the sample means are
the same across samples for all variables. 9293 individuals were in both the ineligible
and eligible samples over the time period resulting in a total of 41,554 individuals
included throughout the entire analysis.

Table 3:

Pre and Post Trends in State Insurance Coverage Rates Work Disabled

Sample 1992-2008 March CPS

Notes: Results are from the 1992–2008 March CPS. Regressions are OLS regressions
of four types of state insurance coverage rates (Medicaid only, Private Only, Both
Medicaid and Private, and Uninsured) on a pre-adoption trend and a post-adoption
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trend. All regressions control for state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level. * Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5%
significance level. *** Represents a 1% significance level. All regressions are weighted
using the SHADAC constructed weight for CPS health insurance coverage.

Table 4:

Changes in Health Insurance Coverage, 1996 to 2007, by Income Group

Work Disability Sample from 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP Panels

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level.
Income groups are based on countable income as a percent of the federal poverty
level. Sample sizes are 12,888 in <=74% FPL group, 2467 in 74–100% FPL group,
3400 in 100–150% FPL group, 5533 in 150% + FPL group. Overlap represents
respondents who report having both private and Medicaid coverage. Medicaid
represents respondents reporting Medicaid and no private coverage. Private represents
respondents reporting private and no Medicaid coverage. Results are weighted using
the individual weight from the SIPP. * Represents a 10% significance level. **
Represents a 5% significance level. *** Represents a 1% significance level.
Source: Author’s calculation
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Table 5:

Crowd-out from Difference-in-Difference Analysis Work Disability Sample

from 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP Panels

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are constructed from Table 4 estimates
using the delta method. The table contains crowd-out measures using difference-indifference estimates in Table 4. The “No Overlap” column does not account for the
population reporting both private and Medicaid insurance coverage. The “Overlap”
column accounts for this population assuming that the change in overlap coverage
represents a transition from private to public coverage. Income groups represent
monthly income of the individual minus Medicaid disregards as a percent of the federal
poverty level. * Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% significance
level. *** Represents a 1% significance level.
Source: Author's calculation.
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Table 6:

OLS Estimates of Insurance Coverage Regressions, Work Disability

Sample from 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP Panels

Notes: Results are from the 1996, 2001, and 2004 panels of the SIPP. Regressions are
OLS regressions of four forms of health coverage (Medicaid only, Private Only, Both
Medicaid and Private, and Uninsured) on imputed Medicaid eligibility. All models
included 170,909 observations and control for panel-wave, state and year fixed
effects, a state-linear trend, age, age squared, a cubic in income, number of children
in household, and family size. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *
Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% significance level. ***
Represents a 1% significance level. All regressions are weighted using the SIPP
provided person-level weight.
Source: Author's calculation.
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Table 7:

First-Stage Estimates for and 2SLS Estimates of Insurance Coverage

Regressions, Work Disability Sample from 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP Panels

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *
Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% significance level. ***
Represents a 1% significance level. All models have 170,909 observations. All
regressions are weighted using the SIPP provided person-level weight. All regressions
control for panel-wave, state and year fixed effects, a state linear trend, age, age
squared, a cubic in income, number of children in household, and family size.
Source: Author's Calculation.

Table 8:

The Extent of Crowd-out from Work Disability Population from 1996,

2001, 2004 panels of the SIPP

Notes: Numbers in brackets are 95% confidence intervals and these values are
constructed using a clustered bootstrap with 350 repetitions. The No Overlap column
estimates the extent of crowd-out without considering the population with overlapping
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coverage. The Overlap column includes the overlapping coverage population in its
calculation assuming that the change in overlap coverage represents a transition from
private to public coverage.

Table 9:

First-Stage for and 2SLS Estimates of Insurance Coverage Regressions

Robustness of Results to Alternative Samples

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *
Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% significance level. ***
Represents a 1% significance level. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions of four forms
of health coverage (Medicaid only, Private Only, Both Medicaid and Private, and
Uninsured) for different sample populations using simulated eligibility as an
instrument. All columns control for state and year fixed effects, age, age squared,
number of children in household, family size, female sex, black race, Hispanic origin,
marital status, cubic in personal income, less than high school education, and high
school diploma.

Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 40 (March 2015): pg. 69-82. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

38

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Panel A: Results for this table are for the 1997–2008 March CPS surveys. Sample
includes all individuals between the ages of 20 and 64 who report a work disability.
The 5 states that are not uniquely identified in the SIPP are excluded from the CPS
analysis. Results are weighted using the SHADAC constructed weight for CPS health
insurance coverage.
Panel B: Sample includes individuals between the ages of 20 and 64 in the 1996,
2001, and 2004 panels of the SIPP who do not report a work disability. All regressions
are weighted using the SIPP provided person-level weight.
Panel C: Sample includes individuals between the ages of 20 and 64 who report a
work disability in the in all 3 of the first three waves of each SIPP panel. All
regressions are weighted using the SIPP provided person-level weight.
Source: Author's calculation.

Table 10:

Effects of Medicaid Eligibility on Insurance Coverage for Work-Disabled

Individuals in the 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP Panels: Adjusting Insurance Coverage
Measures to Account for Medicare (170,909 observations)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. *
Represents a 10% significance level. ** Represents a 5% significance level. ***
Represents a 1% significance level. All regressions are weighted using the SIPP
provided person-level weight. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions of various forms of
health coverage on Medicaid income eligibility using simulated eligibility as an
instrument. Coverage forms are defined similar as in earlier tables, but now take into
account Medicare coverage. Three represents coverage by all three forms of insurance
(Medicaid, Private, and Medicare). All columns control for panel-wave, state and year
fixed effects, a state-linear trend, age, age squared, a cubic in income, number of
children in household, family size, female sex, black race, Hispanic origin, marital
status, less than high school education, and high school diploma.
Source: Author's calculation.
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Appendix: Pathways for Disabled Medicaid Eligibility
A.1 Categorical Eligibility – SSI Recipients
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program is run by the Social
Security Administration (SSA) and provides a cash supplement to the aged
and disabled who have few financial resources. Individuals are eligible to
receive SSI if their countable income and assets are less than the income and
resource eligibility levels determined by the SSA.28 In 2012, the SSI income
and resource eligibility levels for an individual were 75% of the federal
poverty level (FPL) and $2,000 respectively (Social Security Administration,
2012).
States are required to offer Medicaid to all SSI recipients unless they
use a 209(b) option that allows states to employ stricter eligibility levels than
SSI requirements. However, under this option, the eligibility levels cannot be
any more restrictive than Medicaid eligibility levels used by the state in 1972
– when SSI was created. Eleven states used the 209(b) option in 2009. 29
Each 209(b) state has at least one aspect of Medicaid eligibility that is more
restrictive than federal SSI standards. The most obvious method of imposing
stricter standards is through lower income and resource eligibility levels
though some states choose stricter definitions of disability or countable
income/assets. Standards for SSI have changed little over the time period
considered in this paper. SSI/categorical eligibility is the only mandatory
Medicaid pathway for the aged and disabled that all states must offer. All
other pathways are at the option of the state.

A.2 State Supplemental Payments (SSP)
States may choose to offer supplementary payments to SSI recipients
and also to those who do not qualify for SSI but have lower levels of income.
The state supplemental payment option allows states to increase their cash
assistance levels for the elderly and disabled above the federal standard.
States choose the size of their supplemental payments effectively creating an
income “floor” for eligible state residents. States have complete control over

28

Countable income is the applicant’s total income minus certain monetary disregards. There is a
federally mandated disregard of $20 dollars though some states are more generous. In addition,
$65 of earned income plus half of remaining earnings are disregarded when constructing
countable income. See the SSA’s “Understanding Supplemental Security Income” website at
http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-understanding-ssi.htm for more information. 29 These states were
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Virginia.
29

These states were Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Virginia.
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SSP eligibility levels and can vary them by living arrangement, type of
recipient (aged or disabled), and by regional differences (typically differences
in the cost of living) within a state (Stone, 2002). Throughout my analysis, I
use SSP levels for an individual living independently since the data only
contain information for non-institutionalized individuals. The income eligibility
level for the SSP pathway is roughly equal to the maximum allowance offered
through SSI plus the additional SSP payments. All states, however, must use
the SSI resource levels unless they are a 209(b) state.30
Individuals who receive SSP from the state but do not qualify for SSI
are referred to as SSP-only recipients and are not eligible for Medicaid
through the SSI pathway.31 States have the option to extend Medicaid
coverage to SSP-only individuals and most states offering SSP pursue this
option. In 2001, twenty-five states offered SSP-only Medicaid coverage to the
qualifying individuals living independently (Bruen, 2003). Most states offer a
supplement that raises an individual’s income and subsequent Medicaid
eligibility level just above SSI levels. Some states, however, offer large
payments that can effectively raise the SSP-only Medicaid income eligibility
level above the federal poverty level (Bruen, 2003).32 SSP policies have also
varied little over the time period considered in this paper.

A.3 Medically Needy
A medically needy program allows individuals with high income but
large amounts of medical expenses to qualify for Medicaid coverage. States
with medically needy programs allow residents to subtract their medical
expenses from their countable income and essentially “spend- down” to
Medicaid eligibility. That is, for states with medically needy programs there is
effectively no income limit on Medicaid applicants as long as an applicant
incurs enough medical costs to reach the medically needy income limit.
209(b) states who do not have a medically needy program must allow
individuals to spend down to eligibility. Though states may choose to offer
less generous benefits packages to medically needy individuals, medically
needy packages are essentially the same as those offered for income eligible
recipients.
States can choose medically needy income and resource levels unique
from other pathways for eligibility. Most states choose to set their medically
30

In which case they use the resource level used by the 209(b) state.

31

SSP-only individuals are those who have incomes higher than SSI levels, but lower than the
income floor set by the state.
32

States with the maximum SSI/SSP for the independently living aged and disabled above 100%
of the FPL in 2001 were Connecticut and Alaska.
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needy levels well below poverty and sometimes even below SSI standards. To
qualify under the medically needy pathway, applicants get a certain time
period (1 to 6 months depending on the state) to reduce their income by their
medical expenses. If they reach the medically needy income limit after the
deduction of their medical expenses then they qualify for Medicaid coverage
for the rest of the period. Except for four states (Texas and South Carolina
eliminated their medically needy programs in 1996 and 1993 respectively.
Oklahoma and Oregon both ended their medically needy programs in 2003),
all states that had a medically needy program in 1991 also had them in 2008.
In 2008, 33 states had a medically needy program.

A.4 Medicaid Buy-in for the Working Disabled
Though Medicaid does disregard certain amounts of earned income
when determining eligibility, many working disabled have too much income to
qualify for Medicaid coverage. This pathway allows disabled individuals to
work and earn up to 250% of the federal poverty level. Unlike other Medicaid
recipients, however, workers qualifying under this pathway have to pay a
premium and buy-in to the Medicaid program. Premiums for the Medicaid
buy-in tend to be much smaller than those available on the private market.

A.5 Medicare Cost Sharing – Dual Eligibles: QMB’s, SLMB’s, and QI’s
Medicaid always acts as the payer of last resort allowing all other
sources of payment to be exhausted before coverage. Disabled individuals
who have been covered under Social Security Disability Insurance for 24
months qualify for coverage by Medicare. Medicare, however, is not a full
coverage health insurance plan though its coverage is quite extensive. There
are gaps within Medicare benefits (such as long-term care expenses and
prescription drug costs) and it also requires premiums and copays that many
low income individuals may not be able to afford.
To prevent Medicare eligible individuals from dropping their Medicare
policies in favor of less expensive Medicaid coverage, Medicaid began offering
coverage of Medicare premiums and copayments for individuals who qualify
for both Medicare and Medicaid (dual-eligibles). For dual-eligibles, Medicaid
will only cover what Medicare does not, allowing Medicare to cover many of
the first order expenses.
There are three forms of dual-eligibles that qualify for different
provisions through Medicaid. A Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) was
established under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. QMB’s
receive Medicaid coverage of Medicare Part B premiums, deductibles, and
copayments if they qualify for Medicare Part A and have incomes less than
100% of the Federal Poverty Level. Specified Low-Income Medicare
Beneficiaries (SLMB’s) were established in 1993 and qualify for Medicare Part
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B premiums if they qualify for Medicare Part A and have incomes above 100%
but less than 110% of the federal poverty level. The SLMB income limit was
raised in 1995 to 120% of the FPL. The last of the dual-eligible types is a
Qualifying Individual-1 (QI-1) who has incomes above 120% but below 135%
of the federal poverty level. Medicaid will pay the Part B premiums for QI-1’s.
All Medicare cost sharing participants must have resources less than twice SSI
levels.
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